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Why Professor Lynch Asks the Right Questions 
Sanford Levinson * 
I think it is fair to say that one of the reasons I was invited here today 
is because I reviewed Professor Lynch’s book for the History Book Club.  
My wife, among other people, asks me why, after twenty-five years, I still 
review books for the Club.  Twenty-five years ago, when I was a young, 
underpaid assistant professor at Princeton, the prospect of getting some free 
books and fifty dollars for a review was quite enticing.  Fortunately, my 
station in life is better today so I am no longer as motivated by crass 
economic incentives.  The explanation, I think, is that I love coming across 
interesting, scholarly manuscripts, such as Professor Lynch’s, that would 
not necessarily reach a general audience without a boost.  Professor 
Lynch’s manuscript is a wonderfully written book that makes its argument 
in a very compelling way.  It is a valuable book for both professional 
academics and general readers of American history who reflect about past 
events and their implications for the future.  I was, therefore, especially 
pleased to play some role in its being offered to the 200,000 members of 
the History Book Club. 
Today, I would like to explain my enthusiasm for this book and why I 
think it is so important. 
I will begin with the title, Negotiating the Constitution.  It seems to 
me that much too often we pretend that the Constitution is a given, and that 
there is a magic interpretive path to the one true understanding of the 
Constitution.  For some, it is originalism, for others, it is doctrine or, for yet 
others, fundamental values.  But the shared assumption seems to be that the 
Constitution is a basically completed object, and the task of the interpreter 
is to understand it and apply it. 
This is false.  It is certainly empirically and historically incorrect, and 
I think that this book focuses our attention on the extent to which the 
Constitution was, is, and always will be a negotiated¾rather than merely 
an interpreted¾document.  Professor Lynch reminds readers that there 
were a number of very important episodes in the first decade of the United 
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States dealing with fundamental questions of American federalism and the 
structure of the national government for which there was certainly no 
consensus on what the Constitution really required.  Instead, the solutions 
were negotiated.  The solutions depended not only on who had the better 
arguments, but also, inevitably, on who had the votes.   What is crucial, as 
well as radical, is that Professor Lynch’s book is not about courts.  It is 
about debates in Congress, or debates between Congress and the executive 
branch. 
My own interest in the topic of constitutional negotiation is evident in 
the casebook that I had the privilege to co-edit, first with Paul Brest and 
now, the most recent edition, with Jack Balkin and Akhil Amar.1  The 
casebook begins with James Madison’s speech before the 1791 House of 
Representatives on the unconstitutionality of the Bank of the United 
States.2  Madison’s speech is followed by Edmond Randolph’s Opinion as 
Attorney General,3 Thomas Jefferson’s memorandum to George 
Washington,4 and Alexander Hamilton’s well-known memorandum on the 
constitutionality of the bank.5  Finally, there’s a brief discussion on James 
Madison’s “statement” on the Bank’s constitutionality6¾a statement, not a 
change of mind, because Madison never conceded he was mistaken in 
opposing the Bank on constitutional grounds.7 
Only after this background do students read McCulloch v. Maryland.8 
McCulloch is followed by Andrew Jackson’s veto of the bank renewal in 
1832 in which Jackson says that opinions of the Supreme Court are entitled 
to only so much respect as their reasoning deserves.9  Jackson’s action 
reveals his belief that there is no real theory of precedent, because what is 
interesting about precedent, what makes precedent precedent, is that you 
 
 1 See PAUL BREST, SANFORD LEVINSON, J.M. BALKIN, & AKHIL REED AMAR, 
PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING 140-43 (2000) [hereinafter BREST, ET AL., 
CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING]. 
 2 See id.at 8-11 (discussing James Madison’s Speech to the House of Representatives 
(1791) reprinted in JAMES M ADISON, WRITINGS 480-90 (Jack Rakove ed., 1999)). 
 3 See id. at 11-12 (discussing H.  JEFFERSON POWELL, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE 
ATTORNEYS GENERAL xv (1999)). 
 4 See id. at 12-13 (discussing THOMAS JEFFERSON, OPINION ON THE CONSTITUTIONALITY 
OF THE BILL FOR ESTABLISHING A NATIONAL BANK, reprinted in 19 PAPERS OF THOMAS 
JEFFERSON 275, 279-80 (1974)). 
 5 See id. at 13-16 (discussing 8 PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 97 (1965)). 
 6 See id. at 16-17 (discussing BRAY HAMMOND, BANKS AND POLITICS IN AMERICA FROM 
THE REVOLUTION TO THE CIVIL WAR 233 (1957)). 
 7 See id. at 17.  In 1816 he signed the second bank renewal, stating that there had been 
a settlement of the issue as to the constitutionality of the bank and he would accept that 
settlement though it ran contrary to his own views.  See HAMMOND, supra note 6, at 227-33. 
 8 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). 
 9 See BREST, ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING, supra note 1, at 51 (discussing 
2 M ESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 576-89 (Richardson ed., 1897)). 
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feel an obligation to follow it even if you think the prior decision was 
wrong, stupid, or pernicious.  Indeed, if you follow a previous decision 
because you think they got it right, you are not adhering to precedent.  
Rather, you are applauding a court for having the wisdom to get it right. 
It seems to me that one of the very worst things that we, as teachers of 
constitutional law, do to our students it to teach them that the Constitution 
is simply what the Supreme Court says it is.  A course that begins with 
Marbury v. Madison, and then marches through fifty, sixty, ninety (or even 
more) cases from the Supreme Court, will leave any rational student 
believing that the Constitution is simply what the Supreme Court says it is.  
In contrast, the message of Professor Lynch’s book, and I think it is 
absolutely crucial, is that the Constitution is not only what the Court says, 
but what each branch of the federal government says.  Just as it is foolish to 
say that courts have no role in interpreting what the Constitution means, it 
is foolish to say that only courts issue authoritative opinions. 
My view is that all three branches of government are constantly 
negotiating with one another as to what the Constitution means.  
Sometimes courts play an active part in the negotiating process.  
Sometimes they really take a pass.  For example, who knows exactly what 
powers the President of the United States has to wage war on foreign 
countries without congressional consent?  Or whether the President may 
wage war with the kind of “bare bones” congressional consent falling far, 
far, short of a formal declaration of war?  The one thing we can be 
relatively confident about is that the Supreme Court of the United States 
has had nothing useful to say about this issue, and will continue to say 
nothing useful, because they have decided, rightly or wrongly, to take a 
pass. 
The most important lesson to learn from reading Professor Lynch’s 
book is that members of the first several Congresses never really thought 
that it was important to try to predict what courts would say.  None of 
them, to my knowledge, ever said, ‘we shouldn’t be having this debate 
because courts will tell us.’  This is a very important lesson to learn, 
because we ought to expect more constitutional seriousness than we 
sometimes get from members of Congress and the executive branch.  One 
of the ways that constitutional irresponsibility has become legitimized is 
through acceptance of the view that the Constitution is simply what the 
Court says it is.  Such irresponsibility essentially means that what members 
of Congress and the executive branch thinks about constitutional matters is 
beside the point. 
For example, members of this panel discussed the relevance of 
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presidential “signing statements,”10 and Judge Gibbons mentioned that 
when he recently argued before the Supreme Court, Chief Justice 
Rehnquist asked “what deference do we give to [the] signing statement by 
the President?”11  The correct empirical answer to that question is “none,” 
but one might ask why not?  Why does the Court disregard the thoughtful 
opinion of the President of the United States, especially if the opinion is 
crafted after consultation with the head of the Office of Legal Counsel or 
the Solicitor General?  Why is that not worth taking seriously? 
One of the things I am most dismayed about regarding the current 
Court is a kind of megalomania in claiming sole authority to interpret the 
Constitution.  This is seen most dramatically in City of Boerne v. Flores.12  
In Boerne, the Court treats an almost unanimous vote of both houses of 
Congress as absolutely irrelevant, and it similarly dismisses the opinion of 
the President of the United States regarding the free exercise of religion. 
We constantly need to be reminded, as Professor Lynch’s book most 
notably does, of the necessity to look beyond the courts.  Consider, for 
example, the events of 1803, a few years after the close of Professor 
Lynch’s book.  The most important constitutional event in 1803 was the 
Louisiana Purchase.13  It was not Marbury.  The Louisiana Purchase 
fundamentally changed the entire character of the United States of 
America.14  President Thomas Jefferson had good reason to believe that the 
Purchase was unconstitutional without a constitutional amendment.15  But 
again, our students are never taught about the Louisiana Purchase and its 
constitutional complexities because the debate took place entirely outside 
the courts.  Instead, we teach them in effect that constitutional law begins 
in 1803 with Marbury.  I think that is utterly wrong. 
As somebody who begins my course with an extended treatment of 
 
 10 See id. at 55-58.  “At least since the time of Woodrow Wilson’s presidency, 
presidents have on occasion issued ‘signing statements’ explaining that they regard certain 
parts of legislation they are signing as unconstitutional and indicating their intention not to 
comply with the statutory language.”  Id. at 55-56.  For a recent analysis of the legal 
significance of Presidential signing statements by a member of the executive branch see 
Memorandum for Bernard N. Nussbaum, Counsel to the President, from Walter Dellinger, 
Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Office of Legal Counsel, Nov. 3, 1993, 
reprinted in 47 ARK. L. REV. 333 (1995). 
 11 See Oral Argument on Behalf of the Petitioner, Williams v. Taylor, 1999 U.S. Trans. 
LEXIS 73, at *10-11 (Oct. 4, 1999). 
 12 521 U.S. 507 (1997).  The Court similarly disregarded the opinion of the Congress in 
Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents, and held the Age Discrimination in Employment Act 
exceeded Congressional authority under the Fourteenth Amendment.  See 528 U.S. 62 
(2000). 
 13 See BREST, ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING, supra note 1, at 73 (citing 
EVERETT S. BROWN, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE LOUISIANA PURCHASE  (1920)). 
 14 See id. at 73-75. 
 15 See id. at 74-75. 
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the Bank of the United States, it seems very, very difficult to reject 
Professor Lynch’s view.  Professor Lynch’s book provides an argument 
that illuminates certain episodes in our past.  If taken seriously, his work 
requires rethinking the way that we present the entire subject of 
constitutional law to our students, to lawyers and ultimately, to a public 
that hopes to learn what it means to take living under a constitution 
seriously. 
 
